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Abstract
This paper proposes, under assumptions of sincere voters with some addi-
tional conditions, to calculate the positions of parties and districts by “solving”
a system of equations whose left hand sides are theoretical predictions and the
right hand sides are the actual numbers of votes gained by the parties in the
districts. The positions of parties and prefectures are calculated for the seats for
the proportional representation in the Japanese congressional elections 1983 –
2004. The result reveals that the competition in these elections was not between
the right and the left, but between the urban and the rural.
1 Introduction
Estimation of positions of parties (or candidates) in the policy space plays a substan-
tial role in empirical researches based on the classic Downsian model [4]. Various
approaches are proposed in its long history. Laver and Schoﬁeld [15, Appendix B]
classiﬁed them into four groups: expert judgements, dimensional analysis of legisla-
tive behavior, analysis of manifestos and analysis of mass survey data. The third
is replaced by the analysis of the actual expenditure ﬂows in Laver and Hunt [14,
p.31]. Their development thereafter can be requoted from recent papers such as
Burden [2], Kim and Fording [9], etc.
These works deﬁne as many policy spaces together with metrics therein. In the
classic one-dimensional Downsian framework, there must be only one correct space.
We have no a priori reason which one to choose as this correct space.
This paper proposes to determine the positions of parties/candidates directly by
solving a system of equations under the classice Downsian assumptions of sincere
voters and one-dimensional policy.
We deal with a congressional election (resp. a presidential election) competed
by parties (resp. candidates) Pn(n = 1, 2, . . . ,N). When we deal with parties of
a congressional election of a multi-constituency system, we understand that all the
candidates of a party are at a political position, as was formulated in Austen-Smith
[1] and Hinich and Ordeshook [5]. Thus, the policy of Pn is denoted by a real number
xn ∈ (−∞,∞). Behavior of a voters is described just as in the classic Downsian
words.
Assumption 1 The policy space is one-dimensional line (−∞,∞). The voters are
sincere, that is, a voter at ξ votes for Pn which attains min1≤n≤N |ξ − xn|.
In national elections, publicly announced are the numbers of votes gained by a
party (resp. a candidate) in suitable subregions such as constituencies, administra-
tive districts, or others. In the present paper, we call such subregions districts, and
denote by Dk(k = 1, 2, . . . ,K). Our main assumption is as follows.
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Assumption 2 A voter in any Dk(k = 1, 2, . . . ,K) has a chance to vote for any
Pn(n = 1, 2, . . . ,N). We know the numbers Jn,k of votes which Pn gained in Dk.
The densities of the voter’s opinions on Dk are given by Vkσ φ(
x−μk
σ ) in terms of a
voter’s opinion x , where Vk(=
∑N
n=1 Jn,k) is the total number of voters in DK , φ(·)
an a priori determined symmetric probability density function, μk the median voters’
policies in Dk, and σ a district independent scale parameter.
Assumption 2 implies that the densities of all regions become identical if they are
suitably shifted.
Suppose that parameters x1, x2, . . . , xN , μ1, μ2, . . . , μK and σ in Assumption
2 are ﬁxed. We have mathematically rigorous preditions of the numbers of votes
which Pn gain in Dk. Then, we have as many equations whose left hand sides are
the theoretical predictions and the right hand sides are Jn,k. By “solving” this
system of equations, we have xn(n = 1, 2, . . . ,N), μk(k = 1, 2, . . . ,K) and σ. The
number of these equations is almost always larger than the number N + K + 1 of
unknows, i.e., the system is overdetermined, but there are many plausible techniques
for solving this problem.
Our direct approach is promised to work if all of our assumptions are satisﬁed.
In the presence of strategic voting (e.g., Cox [3]), directional voting (e.g., Merrill
III, S. and Grofman [16]), or any other violations of our assumptions, our approach
is justiﬁed only through empirical experiences. This paper gives a positive example
by calculating the political positions of parties and prefectures for the seats for the
proportional representation in the Japanese congressional elections 1983 – 2004.
Our result reveals that not the conﬂict between the left and the right but the
conﬂict between the urban and the rural explains the results. This result itself might
be of some interest, because it is often believed that the main issue is ideological
conﬂicts between the left and the right. This ﬁnding warns that we must carefully
choose the policy space among possible electional issues if we want to relate it with
the Downsian position.
2 Proposed Method
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that
−∞ = x0 < x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xN < xN+1 =∞ (1)
hold. Here, x0 and xN+1 are formally introduced for the sake of compact description.
From Assumptions 1 and 2, we have both the theoretical prediction of the numbers
of votes gained by Pn in DK and their actual values Jn,k. Since both values should
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be equal, we have the following system of N×K equations with respect to N+K+1
unknown variables: x1, x2, . . . , xN , μ1, μ2, . . . , μK and σ,
Vk
∫ xn+xn+1
2
xn−1+xn
2
1
σ
φ(
ξ − μk
σ
)dξ = Jn,k, n = 1, 2, . . . ,N. (2)
By solving this equations, we have what we want.
Figure 1: Theoretical shares of votes of Pk(k = 1, 2, 3, 4) in D1 and D2 when P3
does not ﬁeld its candidate in D2
The calculated positions depend on the choice of φ(x). In the empirical work in
the next section, we take φ(x) as the standard normal density:
φ(x) =
1√
2π
e−
x2
2 . (3)
Here, we have the following theoretical problems to be solved:
1. If (x1, x2, . . . , xN , μ1, μ2, . . . , μK , σ) is a solution, (x1 + α, x2 + α, . . . , xN +
α, μ1+α, μ2+α, . . . , μK+α, σ) and (βx1, βx2, . . . , βxN , βμ1, βμ2, . . . , βμK , |β|σ)
are also solutions to (2) for any real numbers α and β.
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2. Since N ×K is usually larger than N +K +1, the equation is usually overde-
termined.
3. The result depends on the preﬁxed φ.
We can solve the ﬁrst problem simply by pre-determining two unknowns arbitrarily.
In our empirical work in the next section, we take σ as 1, and take the location of
the median voter of the nation at the origin. Thus, the solution of the following
equation with respect to x is zero:
K∑
k=1
Vk
∫ x
−∞
1
σ
φ(
ξ − μk
σ
)dξ =
1
2
K∑
k=1
Vk.
To ﬁx the freedom of reﬂection with respect to the origin, we choose the party
positions so that the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) is always located to the right
of the CP (Communist Party).
A natural solution to the second problem is to choose the unknowns which mini-
mize a suitably weighted sum of squared discrepancies or any other similar distance
between the left hand sides and the right hand sides of (2). In the next section,
however, we take another approach, which provides us with a clearer interpretation.
Suppose that a voter in Dk chooses his vote independently and randomly according
to the theoretical probability appearing in the left hand side of (2). Then we can
regard Jn,k as a realization of a vector-valued random variable which follows a multi-
nomial distribution. Thus, we use the maximum likelihood estimator in estimating
the parameters.
The third problem is an intrinsic shortcoming of our approach, but we can relax
it if we carry out the estimation for a large family of densities containing additional
parameters other than xn, μk and σ.
We must comment on some technical problems in handling data.
1. If a party Pn does not ﬁeld a candidate in a district Dk, we must arrange the
corresponding equation in (2) by deleting Pn (Fig. 1) .
2. Under the existence of noises, estimated locations of small parties are unre-
liable. Even in the absence of noises, we cannot determine the loctions of
non-partisan candidates or frivolous parties which participate in small number
of districts.
3. Reliable computation of solution of (2) becomes rapidly troublesome as N
increases.
Finally, the following remarks are required in using and understanding the results.
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1. No assumptions are made on the parties’ behavior.
2. All we can detect is relative positions among the parties/candidates in an
election. It implies the followings.
(a) We cannot detect any temprocal changes if the locations of voters and the
parties shift or expand proportionally with keeping their relative positions
intact.
(b) When N = 2, a solution by this approach carries no information on
their political position. Positions of districts has some meaning, but our
approach is reduced to be a version of Burden [2] who determined the
position of states in the sub-presidential election by the ratio of votes
which Bush, the winner, gained.
3 Japanese Congressional Elections 1983-2004
In this section, we apply our approach to the seats for the proportional representation
in the Japanese congressional elections 1983 – 2004.
Japan is bicameral. In the Lower House (the House of Representatives), from
1996 on, taken is the dual system of single-member constituencies (300 seats) and
party-list proportional representation (200 seats in 1996, 180 seats from 2000 on). In
the Upper House (the House of Councilors), from 1983 on, the dual system of multi-
member districts and proportional representation is used. Until 2000, the number
of their seats are 152 and 100, respectively, while from 2001 on, they are 146 and
96. Since we are only interested in the numbers of votes gained by the parties, we
do not go into the details of the systems.
Outcome of an election in single-/multi-member districts in Japan is subtantially
aﬀected by the characteristics of candidates. Furthermore, even a comparatively
large party does not ﬁeld candidates in all the districts. To minimize such eﬀects,
we deals only with the seats of proportional representation. Thus, we have the
results of the Lower House 1996 through 2003, and the Upper House from 1983
through 2004. The four general elections (the elections of the Lower House) in 1983,
1986, 1990 and 1993 are simply neglected.
We take up the prefectures as the districts for this calculation. Both in the Lower
and the Upper Houses, a prefectures is a subarea of a constituency for the seats for
the proportional representation. The prefectures remained as it is throughout this
period while other administrative districts such as cities and villages are repeatedly
merged everywhere. In this period, complicated changing alignment of parties is
observed. Since the results of small parties are unreliable, we must determine the
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threshold to cut oﬀ small parties. We take the share of 7 percent as this threshold.
The following parties ﬁlter down.
LDP(1955-) the Liberal Democratic Party
JNP(1992-1994) the Japan New Party
DSP(1969-1994) the Democratic Socialist Party
NFP(1994-1997) the New Frontier Party
LP (1998-2003) the Liberal Party
CGP(1964-1994, 1998-) the Clean government Party
SP(1945-1996) the Socialist Party 　
SDPJ(1996-) the Social Democratic party of Japan
DP(1996-) the Democratic Party
CP(1922-) the Communist Party
The LDP were a governmental party through most of the period. The LP was merged
in the DP just before the election 2003. The Clean Government Party participated
in the New Frontier Party between 1994 and 1998.
The calculated coordinates of the parties are given in Figure 2. The governmental
parties after the elections are marked. From August 1993 through July 1994, the
LDP was an opposition party, but the general election July 1993 is excluded in our
data, so that the LDP are marked in all the elections.
We ﬁrst ﬁnd that the following.
Observation The SP and the SDPJ (the successor of the SP) are located between
the LDP and CGP, DP and others. It means that this axis does not reﬂect
the competition between the left and the right. (For justiﬁcation through
academic references, see, e.g., Kobayashi [11, pp.201] or Kato and Laver [7,
p.109]. )
What does it mean, then ? The work by Inoguchi [6] seems to be the ﬁrst
research on the political positions, which is based on the analysis of party pledges.
From then on, we ﬁnd three works on the positions of Japanese parties whose target
periods overlap with that of ours. The works by Laver and Hunt [14, pp.242-250]
and Kato and Laver [7] are based on expert judgements in 14 categories and 11
categories, respectively. Kobayashi [11, pp.32-33] derived two scales based both on
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1983
(U)

LDP(0.543)

SP(-0.110)

CGP(-0.458)

DSP(-1.238)

CP(-1.326)
1986
(U)

LDP(0.591)

SP(-0.350)

DSP(-0.462)

CGP(-0.823)

CP(-1.662)
1989
(U)

LDP(1.221)

SP(-0.380)

CGP(-1.164)

CP(-1.590)
1992
(U)

LDP(0.601)

SP(-0.130)

CGP(-0.537)

CP(-1.219)

JNP(-1.421)
1995
(U)

LDP(0.769)

SP(0.184)

NFP(-0.293)

CP(-2.182)
1996
(L)

LDP(1.127)

NFP(-0.438)

CP(-0.513)

DP(-1.385)
1998
(U)

LDP(0.848)

SDPJ(0.384)
LP(0.363)

DP(-0.145)

CGP(-0.878)

CP(-1.158)
2000
(L)

LDP(0.745)

LP(0.366)

SDPJ(0.123)

CGP(-0.126)

DP(-0.563)

CP(-1.899)
2001
(U)

LDP(0.494)

DP(-0.077)

LP(-0.415)

SDPJ(-0.530)

CGP(-0.845)

CP(-1.917)
2003
(L)

LDP(0.525)

CGP(0.150)

DP(-0.274)

CP(-2.533)
2004
(U)

LDP(1.231)

DP(-0.348)

CGP(-0.993)

CP(-1.794)
Figure 2: The positions of parties in the elections 1983-2004 ((L) and (U) denote
the Lower House and the Upper House, respectively.)
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the analysis of party pledges and expenditure ﬂow by a multidimensional scaling
method.
Among these 27 scales, we ﬁnd that only the scale of “Pro urban interests vs.
anti” in Laver and Hunt [14, p.245] seems to be consistent with the above observa-
tion. A possible approach to check the reliability of this coincidence is to calculated
the correlation between our coordinate values and suitable urbanization index of
Dk. There are several possible indices for urbanization: population ratios of pri-
mary(tertiary) industries, the DID (Densely Inhabited District) population ratios,
etc. Here the DID is the concept ﬁrst introduced in the 1960 Population Census
by the Statistics Bureau of the Japanese government. The DID is deﬁned as an
area which is group of contiguous Basic Unit Blocks each of which has a population
density of 4,000 inhabitants or more per square kilometer, or which has public, in-
dustrial, educational and recreational facilities, and whose total population is 5,000
or more within a shi(city), ku, machi(town), or mura(village).
Table 1 gives the correlation coeﬃcients between the median voters’ locations of
the prefectures and their DID population ratios. We ﬁnd strong negative correla-
tions, all statistically signiﬁcant at level 1 percent. This result seems to support our
observation above.
Table 1: The correlation coeﬃcients between the median voters’ locations and the
DID population ratios
1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2003 2004
-0.758 -0.747 -0.790 -0.597 -0.585 -0.594 -0.738 -0.679 -0.619 -0.464 -0.584
Table 2 gives the median voters’ positions of Dk(k = 1, 2, . . . , 47). We can check
the stability of the results over time.
Notice that our results are closely related with those in Kobayashi [11, pp.156-
167]. Based on the data of the general elections during 1958-1993, he found that
the LDP and the SP gained votes mainly in the rural areas through 1958-1993 and
1969-1993, respectively. He also found that the CGP, the CP and the JNP gained
votes in the urban areas. Except in the case of the JNP which is calculated for a
diﬀerent election, his results strongly consistent with ours.
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Table 2: The median voter locations of the prefectures based on the calculation for
the seats for the proportional representation in the national elections 1983-2004
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Since the pioneering works of Kyogoku [13, Chap. 4] and Shinohara [17, pp.110-
120] in 1968, Kobayashi [10, Chap. 3](the general elections 1960-1980), Takagi
[18](the general election 1996) , Kuboya [12] (the four congressional elections during
1995-2000), Kato [8](the general election 2000) analysed the contrast between the
urban and the rural in their voting behavior. Their main concerns depend on their
works but their results are consistent with ours.
Thus, our ﬁnding is new only in the sense that it seats these extablished ﬁndings
in the classic Downsian framework. This result might warn that the political position
of parties should be carefully chosen when we relate it with the Downsian model.
4 Conclusion
We proposed a new approach for determining positions of the policies of parties and
the districts simultaneously from the numbers of votes which the parties gained in the
districts. We applied this approach to the seats for the proportional representation
of the Japanese congressional elections from 1983 throught 2004 to ﬁnd that the
main issue of these elections are not ideology but the urban-rural contest. This
outcome warns that the policy space should be carefully chosen when we use it in
the Downsian framework.
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